Negative Feelings of Gratitude by Manela, Tony
 1 
Negative Feelings of Gratitude 
 
Forthcoming in The Journal of Value Inquiry 
 
 
Tony Manela 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Philosophers generally agree that gratitude, the called-for response to benevolence, includes positive feelings. 
In this paper, I argue against this view. The grateful beneficiary will indeed have certain feelings, but in 
some contexts, those feelings will be profoundly negative. Philosophers overlook this fact because they tend 
to consider only cases of gratitude in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and in which the 
benefactor fares well after performing an act of benevolence. When we consider cases in which a benefactor 
suffers severely, we see the feelings associated with gratitude can be negative, and even quite painful. I 
conclude with a discussion of the implications such negative feelings of gratitude have for the normative 
question of when gratitude is owed, and for the descriptive claim, made by positive psychologists, that 
gratitude enhances wellbeing.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Gratitude is a topic of great disagreement among philosophers. They dispute when it is 
owed, to whom it can be owed, what it amounts to. One point on which philosophers 
seem to agree, however, is that gratitude involves feelings, and that these feelings of 
gratitude are fundamentally positive. My goal in this paper is to argue against this claim. 
Gratitude does imply certain feelings, but there is no single positive feeling of gratitude, 
the way there may be a single positive feeling of joy or of pride. Instead, gratitude is (in 
part) an affective disposition—a disposition to have certain feelings in certain situations. 
Philosophers have overlooked this fact because they tend to consider cases of gratitude in 
a narrow context—namely, a context in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and 
in which the benefactor generally fares well after performing an act of benevolence. 
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When we consider gratitude outside this context, I will show, the feelings associated with 
gratitude can be negative, and indeed quite painful. 
 This essay proceeds as follows. In §II, I define “gratitude” and “feeling,” and 
refine the question this essay aims to answer. In §§III and IV, I summarize what 
philosophers have taken feelings of gratitude to be, and argue against what I call the 
Consensus View on feelings of gratitude: that feelings of gratitude are invariably positive. 
In §V, I identify one normative implication my conclusion has for the question of when 
gratitude is warranted. In §VI, I explore my conclusion’s implications for the descriptive 
claim, commonly put forward by positive psychologists, that gratitude tends to enhance 
mental and social wellbeing. 
 
II. Preliminaries 
 
Gratitude, as I will understand it in this paper, is the proper or fitting response in a 
beneficiary to benevolence from a benefactor. This may strike some as an arbitrarily 
narrow definition of gratitude. As several philosophers have pointed out, ordinary usage 
of gratitude terms suggests that we can (and sometimes should) be grateful even when 
there is no benefactor to be grateful to. 1 It sounds natural to say, for instance, “I am 
grateful that it did not rain on my wedding day,” or “grateful for life’s little blessings.” As 
I have argued elsewhere, however, what is expressed in such prepositionless gratitude 
locutions ultimately amounts to another concept: appreciation.2 To be grateful that it did 
not rain on my wedding day, or for life’s little blessings, is simply to appreciate such states 
of affairs. The concept of gratitude I take as the subject of this paper, by contrast, is a 
fundamentally interpersonal or inter-agential phenomenon. This stripe of gratitude is 
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captured in prepositional gratitude locutions—e.g., gratitude to a stranger for saving one’s 
life, or gratitude to a friend for her support. Gratitude in this sense is the response called 
for in a beneficiary to something good another agent intentionally does for him. For 
brevity, I will say gratitude is properly a response to benevolence.  
 Gratitude, understood as the proper response to benevolence, is a complex 
phenomenon. It includes, for instance, certain cognitive elements: beliefs about the 
benefactor (e.g., that she intended to help the beneficiary, that she went above and 
beyond the call of duty in doing so, etc.), without which a beneficiary might fail to count 
as grateful. The grateful response also includes certain conative elements. A beneficiary 
who believes his benefactor has done something gratitude-worthy, but finds no 
motivation to, say, accede to her reasonable request for help in the future, falls short of 
gratitude. In addition to certain beliefs and certain motivational tendencies, philosophers 
agree that gratitude, as the called-for response to benevolence, includes certain affective 
elements, or feelings.3 And this claim seems difficult to deny. A beneficiary who responds to 
a genuine act of benevolence with mere “cold-blooded thought or desire”4 instead of a 
certain phenomenological excitement seems to fall short of gratitude in an essential way. 
It is the feelings called for in response to benevolence—feelings of gratitude—that will be 
the subject of this paper. 
 Feelings I will understand as “phenomenally conscious mental episodes.”5 They 
can range from experiences like itchiness, ticklingness, queasiness and chill6 to more 
global or holistic feelings. When something wonderful happens to me, for instance, I 
experience feelings of joy; when I do something wonderful, I experience feelings of pride. 
When something terrible happens to me, or when I am in danger, I experience feelings of 
sadness or fear, respectively. As these examples suggest, feelings are essential components 
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of emotions; indeed, we often label feelings by referring to the emotions they 
characteristically accompany, and emotions can often be distinguished from one another 
by the feelings typically associated with them. This is not to say, however, that each 
emotion is associated with a unique feeling. Feelings of sadness, for instance, may be 
phenomenologically identical to (and therefore, the same feelings as) feelings of guilt.7 
What would distinguish the emotions that give rise to such feelings as the emotion of 
sadness or of guilt would be the causal history, beliefs, or motivational tendencies 
associated with each instance of a particular feeling.8 Regardless of how nuanced the 
range of possible human feelings turns out to be, I will take it that by and large, feelings 
can be classified as positive or negative. Positive feelings, like those associated with joy or 
pride, are pleasant, agreeable, and enjoyable.9 Appreciation, the proper response to a 
beneficial state of affairs, likely includes certain positive feelings like those associated with 
joy. By contrast, negative feelings, like those associated with itchiness or guilt, are 
uncomfortable or painful.10 With this terminology on the table, I can now state the view 
against which I will be arguing in the following sections: that the feelings called for in 
response to a genuine act of benevolence are uniquely or invariably positive. 
 
III. The Consensus View on Feelings of Gratitude 
 
The view that feelings of gratitude are positive feelings is widespread among 
philosophers. 11  As Peter Costello puts it, “Within one’s individual exactment and 
experience of gratitude, one maintains a certain posture, that of at-homeness, of reflection, 
of realization and of freedom from anxiety.”12 Many philosophers hold that a genuine act 
of benevolence should incite feelings of joy and pleasure in the grateful beneficiary—not just 
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because of the benefit, but because he has benefited from someone else’s benevolence.13 
Perhaps a bit more specifically and viscerally, several philosophers have suggested that 
feelings of gratitude are “warm” feelings.14  
Some might object to the claim that all philosophers paint such a rosy picture of 
feelings of gratitude. In particular, Aristotle and Kant are sometimes interpreted as 
having taken feelings of indebtedness and shame to be appropriate or called-for in the 
grateful beneficiary, in the sense of being what an ideal beneficiary should feel.15 Aristotle, 
for instance, writes that the megalopsychos “is the sort of person who does good but is 
ashamed when he receives it; for doing good is proper to the superior person, and 
receiving it to the inferior.”16 And Kant suggests in the Lectures on Ethics that beneficiaries 
should cringe at receiving favors, since in doing so, a beneficiary becomes the debtor of 
his benefactor—a shameful position to occupy.17 Closer readings of these philosophers, 
however, show that they did not believe negative feelings of shame and indebtedness were 
appropriate for grateful beneficiaries to feel. Taking Aristotle’s words in context reveals 
that negative feelings the megalopsychos experiences in receiving a favor are not part of the 
proper response to benevolence per se, but response to being in need of benefits from 
others.18 One could imagine a megalopsychos receiving a favor under circumstances that 
would not shame him (say, a favor he did not need), and under these circumstances, 
gratitude may be a welcome experience for him.19 A closer reading of Kant reveals that in 
his case too, negative feelings of indebtedness and threatened self-esteem are not feelings 
a beneficiary necessarily ought to feel; a beneficiary will feel shamed and inferior only 
insofar as he mistakenly believes his worth as a person is contingent on comparing 
favorably to others. Ideally, however, a beneficiary will not feel his self-esteem threatened 
upon receiving a favor, and so will not feel shamed. 20  Ultimately, then, while 
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indebtedness and shame may be natural or common reactions people have when 
receiving genuine acts of benevolence in certain common circumstances, no philosopher 
has argued that they are the sorts of feelings beneficiaries should aspire to have in 
response to another agent’s benevolence. They are not thought to be proper, justified or 
fitting responses to genuine acts of benevolence. I will take it, then, that the claim that 
feelings of gratitude are positive feelings is widely, if not universally, accepted. Going 
forward, I will call this claim the Consensus View. 
 
IV. A Critique of the Consensus View 
 
To see where the Consensus View goes astray, we need to consider how it emerged. Like 
other generalizations about gratitude, philosophers arrive at the Consensus View by 
imagining a range of acts of benevolence, and then reflecting on the proper response one 
would expect to see in an ideally grateful beneficiary under such circumstances. At first 
glance, the range of such cases considered in the philosophical literature on gratitude 
seems quite diverse. The types of benefits they consider range from the giving of delightful 
(but unnecessary) gifts21 to the saving of lives.22 The beneficiaries in such cases range from 
total strangers on the verge of death23 to friends and family members who request favors 
of convenience.24 The nature and degree of the liability incurred by the benefactor in these cases 
also seems diverse. At one extreme, the sacrifice of the benefactor takes the form of an 
inconvenience for the benefactor. Roslyn Weiss and Fred Berger, for instance, consider cases 
involving the giving of gifts and favors with no specifics or context.25,26 In these cases, the 
benefactor’s sacrifice takes the form of the monetary cost of a gift, or the time spent doing 
a favor for someone.27 Other philosophers emphasize the unpleasantness inherent in doing a 
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certain favor, such as watching a neighbor’s child for a week while she is out of town.28 
Several analyses consider cases in which the benefactor’s sacrifice takes the form of effort 
expended. A. John Simmons, for instance, imagines a benefactor jumping into a lake and 
swimming some distance to save a man from drowning.29 David Lyons considers a similar 
case in which the benefactor incurs risk (indeed, grave risk) in addition to expending effort 
to save a drowning man.30 A handful of analyses consider cases in which benefactors can 
be said to suffer in some actual and substantial sense. In one, a benefactor suffers damage 
to his property, in the form of a broken axel caused by rushing a needy beneficiary to the 
hospital;31 in another, a benefactor burns his arm pulling a beneficiary from a burning 
car.32 
All these instances of benefactor liability, however, are similar in one critical way: 
despite the inconvenience, unpleasantness or pain they experience, despite the effort they 
expend, despite the risk they take, the benefactors in each of these scenarios seem to wind 
up alright in the end.33 Simmons’s benefactor has his burn treated, Lyons’s benefactor 
survives his rescue attempt, and the benefactors in the other cases wind up no worse for 
the wear. To my knowledge, no analysis of gratitude considers a case of benevolence in 
which the benefactor’s sacrifice is dire or extreme—a sacrifice that leaves her horribly off. 
If the Consensus View is to be warranted about gratitude generally, it must be consistent 
with such cases. As I will show, however, such cases throw the Consensus View into doubt. 
Consider a genuine act of benevolence in which the sacrifice of the benefactor is 
great. Yonas and Robyn34 are coworkers in a factory, operating dangerous machinery. 
One day, Yonas gets both of his hands caught in one of the machines. Robyn is nearby, 
and realizes that if she does nothing, Yonas will lose both his hands. Thinking quickly (but 
clearly), she does the one thing she can do to stop Yonas from losing his hands: she sticks 
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one of her own hands into the machine, allowing Yonas to withdraw both of his. As a 
result of this, however, Robyn loses her hand. In such cases, the salient emotion Yonas is 
likely to feel will not be joy, pleasure, agreeableness, at-homeness, or any positive emotion. 
Yonas instead should (rightly) feel painful feelings, like those associated with grief, in 
response to Robyn’s sacrifice. This grief might indefinitely overshadow any feelings of 
appreciation Yonas might have had at retaining his arms, or at having such a caring 
benefactor. Crucially, however, Yonas need not be ungrateful for his lack of happy feelings 
here. On the contrary, the absence of negative ones would seem to betray a sort of callous 
ingratitude. Imagine that after the tragedy, Yonas rejoices in having his arms while 
blithely ignoring the suffering of his benefactor. “How lucky was I that such a self-
sacrificing person happened to be walking by!” he tells his friends afterwards. “I’ll never 
take that luck, or my hands, for granted!” Such a beneficiary may be appropriately 
appreciative of having two hands (i.e., “grateful” that he has them). He may even be 
appreciative of the fact that Robyn came to his rescue (“What a great thing that such a 
self-sacrificing person works right next to me!”). But if his response to Robyn’s act of 
benevolence does not include negative grief-like feelings, Yonas seems to fall short of 
being grateful to Robyn. If this is true, then negative feelings are sometimes called for in 
response to acts of benevolence; and insofar as a grateful beneficiary should sometimes 
have negative feelings, we can say there are negative feelings of gratitude—painful or aversive 
feelings that the properly grateful beneficiary ought to have.  
The possibility of negative feelings of gratitude helps explain what might otherwise 
be a puzzling connection, often overlooked among contemporary western philosophers of 
gratitude: the fact that beneficiaries sometimes have simultaneous urges to thank and 
apologize to a benefactor in response to one and the same act of benevolence. Imagine 
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Yves is leaving a supermarket with two armfuls of groceries when he stumbles and falls, 
spilling his groceries across the parking lot. Remy, a benevolent stranger with a single 
armful of groceries, bends over to help him, and in the process, spills her own groceries all 
over the parking lot. Most people in Yves’ situation would feel the urge not only to thank 
the stranger for stopping, but to apologize, or at least express regret, for the sacrifice she 
made in stopping to help. That the proper response to a benefactor’s act of benevolence is 
mixed up with feelings of regret for the sacrifices they make in performing them is more 
obvious in certain linguistic traditions than in others. In Japanese, for instance, a common 
word for expressing gratitude, sumimasen, also commonly serves as a remedial expression 
(“excuse me,” or “I’m so sorry”), depending on the context. Devoid of context, though, 
sumimasen expresses a mix of gratitude (for an act of benevolence) and apology (for being 
the causal centerpiece of the benefactor’s sacrifice or inconvenience in performing it). The 
word thus nicely captures an important (though overlooked) way in which gratitude can 
be a painful experience for the grateful beneficiary. 
 It might be objected that the negative feelings Yves experiences (or should, it 
seems, experience) in this case, while natural, are ultimately irrational, unjustified or 
inappropriate feelings.35 After all, Yves did nothing wrong; he did not wrong Remy, nor 
was he morally responsible for the harm that befell her, and so neither apology nor 
genuine contrition is called for. Indeed, Remy would be quite likely to refuse Yves’s 
apology, on the grounds that he had nothing to apologize for. Any contrition or regret 
Yves might feel would thus be inappropriate or unjustified, like so-called “agent-regret”: 
the regret of a morally innocent agent whose decisions or choices lead to a tragedy. Yves, 
of course, was not so much the agent as the patient in this case, so perhaps the term 
“patient-regret” is more appropriate here.  
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It may be true that contrition or apology is in such instances an irrational (if 
natural) emotion; but that does not mean the regret and the associated negative feelings 
that Yves feels are inappropriate. Regret or grief for the suffering of the benefactor still seems 
called for—that is, rational and justified, and not merely natural. Consider the following 
twist on the supermarket parking lot case: when Remy stops to help Yves pick up his 
groceries, she does not spill her own, and succeeds in getting Yves up, repacked, and back 
to his car in a few moments, without suffering any terrible sacrifice in the process. Yves 
makes it home safely. The next day, however, he reads in the newspaper that Remy was 
killed the night before. She had returned home from the grocery store and walked in on a 
burglary in progress. The details from the police report make it clear that the few 
moments Remy spent helping Yves the day before would not have changed the fact that 
she would have walked in on the burglary if she had not helped, so Yves need not feel 
patient-regret; nor could the tragedy be construed as a sacrifice Remy made for Yves. Still, 
though, insofar as Yves is grateful to Remy, we would expect him to be especially 
saddened, aggrieved or outraged when he hears the news of Remy’s death. In particular, 
we would expect him to be more upset than he would be if he read of a similar tragedy 
befalling a total stranger. At the very least, if he remained totally unmoved upon reading 
about Remy, we would think him not only coldhearted, but ungrateful. What this shows 
is that when a benefactor suffers, a grateful beneficiary should experience negative 
feelings, like those of grief. This is especially true when a benefactor suffers in aiding a 
beneficiary; but it is also true whenever a benefactor suffers in the future.  
Taken together with paradigm cases of gratitude that led to the Consensus View, 
my cases of Yonas and Yves suggest the following generalization about feelings of 
gratitude: as far as feelings go, the grateful beneficiary will have certain positive feelings, 
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like those of joy or pleasure, so long as his benefactor fares well; and certain negative feelings, 
like those of grief or anger, when his benefactor fares poorly. We can think of this conjunction 
of tendencies as goodwill.36 Goodwill in this sense should be understood not strictly 
speaking as a feeling, but as a disposition to have certain feelings in certain situations—
what we might call an affective disposition. For a beneficiary to be grateful to his benefactor 
is (in part) for the beneficiary to have heightened dispositions to be pleased if things go 
well for her, and displeased or upset if things go poorly for her. Feelings of gratitude, then, 
are not uniquely positive; sometimes negative feelings, like those of grief, sorrow or anger, 
are what make a beneficiary grateful. 
 
V. A Normative Implication  
 
In what remains of this paper, I want to explore several implications my conclusion has 
for other debates about gratitude. The first is an implication for a normative question 
about gratitude—specifically, about when gratitude is actually warranted. One particular 
point of disagreement on this question is whether a beneficiary must want, or be content 
with, the fact that some particular benefactor conferred some particular benefit, in order 
for gratitude to be warranted. Simmons, for example, writes that if the beneficiary did not 
want a particular benefit to be provided by some particular benefactor, then the 
beneficiary owes no debt of gratitude to the benefactor.37 Simmons is motivated by 
reasonable concerns about what a beneficiary might owe to a clumsy or controlling or 
generally unliked benefactor. It seems plausible to say that an egalitarian need not be 
grateful for special treatment he receives,38 or that a man need not be grateful to his 
officious and intrusive neighbor for mowing his lawn, unasked.39 But cases of great 
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benefactor sacrifice seem to pose a counterexample to the claim that a beneficiary must 
be happy, or want a benefactor to have benefited him the way she did, in order for 
gratitude to be in order. Imagine a modified version of the case of Robyn and Yonas, 
where Yonas gets both his hands stuck in the machine, and Robyn must sacrifice both of 
her hands to save Yonas’s, which Robyn does. It seems plausible to think that Yonas 
might grieve so deeply for Robyn’s suffering that all things considered, he is unhappy at 
having been benefited by her at that moment in that way. He would have preferred a 
state of affairs in which he lost his hands and she kept hers. Like Yonas, many 
beneficiaries who are sufficiently sensitive to the suffering of those around them might be 
inclined not to want others to sacrifice on their behalf. Still, though, it would seem absurd 
to say such beneficiaries do not owe their benefactors gratitude for their sacrifices. The 
fact that there can be negative feelings of gratitude highlights the possibility that 
beneficiaries may be quite unhappy receiving acts of benevolence from certain 
benefactors who still deserve a great deal of gratitude. If philosophers are concerned to 
rule out the appropriateness of gratitude in cases like Simmons’s, they need to be more 
fine-grained about a beneficiary’s reasons for not wanting a particular benefit to have 
been conferred by a particular benefactor.  
 
VI. Descriptive Implications and Positive Psychology 
 
Normative questions aside, the possibility of negative feelings of gratitude also has 
implications for descriptive claims about gratitude. In particular, it casts doubt on two 
claims made by philosophers and positive psychologists who hold that gratitude 
essentially enhances psychological and social wellbeing.40 The first is the claim that 
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gratitude, when present in a beneficiary, serves as an antidote to certain negative (painful 
or aversive) attitudes.41 Consider, for instance, the negative attitude of regret: an attitude 
in which “some action, event, or state of affairs is construed as unfortunate and contrasted 
with some more propitious alternative.” Regret, I take it, is a negative attitude, which 
contributes to (and perhaps partly constitutes) unhappiness. Some philosophers believe 
that gratitude can protect against or mitigate such painful attitudes. As Robert Roberts 
puts it, the grateful beneficiary “has a shield against such debilitating regrets because he 
or she is inclined to dwell on the favorable, rather than the regrettable.”42 This may be 
perfectly true of a dispositionally appreciative person—someone who habitually seeks out 
the silver lining in all things that come his way. But it is not necessarily true that a grateful 
beneficiary will be inclined to dwell on the favorable and not the regrettable. That will 
only be true in cases in which the benefactor fares well. As my examples in section §IV 
showed, this is not always the case. A properly grateful beneficiary in Yves’s or Yonas’s 
shoes might (and perhaps should) be inclined to dwell on the regrettable fact that his 
benefactor suffered, especially if the benefactor suffered in performing her genuine act of 
benevolence. 
 Consider now the attitude of resentment. Resentment is often held to be a 
negative emotion, evoking unpleasant and aversive feelings in the resenter.43 Gratitude, 
however, is believed to mitigate resentment.44 In receiving a favor or a kindness from 
someone who has harmed or wronged me in the past, the goodwill I experience toward 
my benefactor may indeed go a long way toward neutralizing the ill will I bore her 
previously. Even if gratitude does tend to mitigate resentment toward the benefactor, 
however, it may still serve as the basis for heightened resentment toward third parties. 
Imagine that in the parking lot case, Yves had never spilled his groceries, and Remy had 
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never stopped to help him. When Yves reads about Remy’s murder in the newspaper the 
next morning, he may be saddened, and perhaps angry at the murderers; but in the case 
where Remy helped Yves just before returning home to her untimely demise, it seems 
plausible that Yves would experience a great deal more resentment toward Remy’s 
assailants than he would have otherwise. He might find himself more likely, in the 
following weeks, to lose sleep and be distracted by his angry feelings than if he lacked the 
proper grateful affective disposition, or if Remy had never helped him in the first place. 
Gratitude, then, may in fact lead a grateful beneficiary to experience more resentment 
than if he had never received some act of benevolence. And insofar as resentment and 
regret are associated with negative feelings, gratitude may sometimes heighten, rather 
than ameliorate, such feelings in a grateful beneficiary.45  
Consider now the claim that gratitude, as the proper response to benevolence, is 
socially constructive. This claim follows from the Consensus View of feelings of gratitude 
as positive feelings, together with the (plausible) assumption that such feelings can 
motivate certain pro-social behavior. On the basis of those premises, it could be argued 
that gratitude tends to build beneficial interpersonal relationships, like friendships.46 
When a beneficiary is grateful, he is inclined to benefit his benefactor and bear her 
goodwill. She, in turn, will be inclined to bear him even more goodwill, and be even more 
motivated to benefit him in the future. As the cycle continues, the social bond between 
beneficiary and benefactor grows.47 This might lead us to believe that the more grateful 
the people in a society, the more friendship and camaraderie we would expect to see 
within it. But this generalization may be too hasty. Gratitude may indeed be socially 
constructive insofar as we consider the beneficiary’s relationship with the benefactor. 
When we consider the beneficiary’s relationship to third parties, however, things might be 
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radically otherwise. Recall that in the case of Remy and Yves, it seemed plausible that 
Yves’s gratitude to Remy would result in heightened feelings of anger toward the people 
who murdered Remy. Insofar as such feelings motivate anti-social behavior, and impair 
relationships between individuals, it would also seem to follow that Yves’s gratitude to 
Remy would result in impaired relationships with the people who harmed her. This 
might manifest itself in a heightened reluctance on Yves’ part to forgive the perpetrators, 
or to welcome them back into society after they serve prison sentences and atone for their 
evil deed. This reluctance need not be undue; indeed, in a society where people tend to 
forgive too easily, the reluctance to forgive that might result from gratitude to a victim 
could be perfectly reasonable, and quite healthy for society overall. The fact would still 
remain, however, that gratitude can have a detrimental effect on the formation and repair 
of social relationships—a point that becomes clear only when we admit the possibility of 
negative feelings of gratitude. 
If what I have said is correct, the possibility of negative feelings of gratitude gives 
us reason to qualify the claim that gratitude contributes to mental and social wellbeing.48 
The strongest claim consistent with my conclusions that positive psychologists can make is 
that gratitude is psychologically and socially beneficial so long as the benefactor fares well. The 
general consensus that gratitude contributes to mental and social wellness might be 
reliably true and applicable in affluent, peaceful societies, where everyone, including 
benefactors, is likely to fare well; but things may be quite different in contexts where 
poverty, disease, injustice and violence are widespread. Under such circumstances, where 
the benevolent and kindhearted are likely to suffer, a grateful beneficiary might very well 
grieve and hate more often and more deeply than an ungrateful one.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued that feelings of gratitude are not uniquely positive. Feelings of 
appreciation may be; and feelings of gratitude when a benefactor fares well may be also. But 
gratitude is often called for in cases where a benefactor suffers dearly, and any accurate 
generalizations about gratitude must take such cases into account. When we do consider 
such cases, we see that feelings of gratitude can sometimes be negative, can sometimes 
promote (rather than ameliorate) other negative feelings, and can sometimes be 
detrimental to social relationships. Negative feelings of gratitude also illuminate the 
possibility that gratitude might be called for even when the beneficiary of an act of 
benevolence would have preferred not to be benefited in some particular way by some 
particular benefactor. As philosophers and psychologists continue to research the 
normative and descriptive dimensions of the proper response to benevolence, they should 
keep these points in mind, and should treat seriously cases of gratitude where a benefactor 
sacrifices dearly or suffers terribly. 
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